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IN THE. SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE O.F UTAH
GEORGE D. EYRE, Administrator
of the Estate of CECIL DREWERY
EYRE, deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

No. 8829

MICHAEL FRANK BURDETTE,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This law suit was commenced for the wrongful death
of Cecil Drewery Eyre in an accident which took place
and occurred on Redwood Road at approximately 6275
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at approximately 7:19 o'clock P.M. on the 22nd day of September,
1956. At the time of the accident the decedent was an
occupant of an automobile belonging to and being driven
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by the defendant in a northerly direction. The only other
occupant in this automobile was Lorene ~{assardi who
also filed a law suit against the defendant. The two
law suits were consolidated for trial. This accident was
caused by collisions with oncoming automobiles. The
road at the place of the accident is a straight, level, blacktopped highway with two lanes divided by broken lin~s.
To the South there is a hill, the brow of \vhich is approximately 300 yards from the place of the accident. Traveling South past the point of the accident, as the incline
starts, the South bound lane widens into two lanes to the
top of the hill and then becomes one lane proceeding
down the hill to the South. Proceeding N o:r:th approaching the hill, the North bound lane widens into two lanes
going up the hill and at the top becomes one lane again
proceeding Northerly down the hill. (R.-149). The series
of collisions resulting in the death of Cecil Drewery Eyre
occurred when the Burdette car collided first -with the
North bound Giorgio car; then, proceeding North approximately 46 feet collided 'Yith the N"orth bound Hensley car and then proceeding North approximately 199
feet collided with the Bailey car resulting in the deceased
being thrown out of the automobile of defendant and
directly into the path of the oncon1ing Dr. )Iadsen car approximately 103 feet North from the collision "ith the
Bailey car (Ex. P-1). The investigating officer, Arthur
E. Allen, gave it as his opinion that the first point of linpact was approxilnately 2 feet into the South bound lane
of traffic. This opinion "\Vas based on a tire 111ark and
also a line left by fluid coining fro1n the Giorgio car
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(R-157). (Also see Exhibit P-2 showing clearly the line
left by the fluid.) The officer further gave it as his opinion that points of impact with the other automobiles
were also in the South bound lane of traffic (R-157, 158).
The driver of the first automobile involved with the
Burdette car is Frank Giorgio who testified that he was
driving South on said highway and that the traffic going
South was fairly heavy because of automobiles proceeding to West Jordan where a prize fight was being held
that night. He stated that it was dark and that the automobiles had their lights on. He further stated that he
was traveling in his own lane of traffic when suddenly
an automobile came right at him and that he was hit
while trying to turn to the right (R-203-204). His automobile was damaged on the left front and left side (Ex.
P-16).
Testimony was produced as to the manner in which
the defendant's car was driven from the point where the
car proceeded up the South side of Bennion Hill down
to and including the collisions in which it became involved.
Mr. Ed. Jones testified that he and Mr. Clarence Lovendahl were preparing to come out of his driveway at 6981
South Redwood Road in Mr. Lovendahl's automobile;
that his home is located at the bottom of Bennion Ilill on
the South; that they had to stop to let a light colored
Ford automobile proceeding North pass by; that this
automobile was proceeding at a high rate of speed which
he estimated to be between 60 and 70 miles per hour;
that as the automobile proceeded up the hill it proceeded
in an erratic course across the double center line and
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over to the extreme West side of the road and back to his
side of the road again and then back over the double
center line a second time before passing over the hill.
Mr. Jones and Mr. Lovendahl then proceeded North, and
at the top of the hill observed what appeared to be a ball
of fire and observed, on reaching the scene of the accident, that the car which he had seen had been involved
in an accident (R-175-179).
Mr. Lovendahl in his testimony added that the light
colored car almost hit a culvert on the extreme West side
of the highway when it passed over the double center
line and estimated the speed of the light colored autoInobile to be 70 miles an hour (R-186).
Mr. Wilford Green was driving an automobile in a
Northerly direction proceeding up the South side of Bennion Hill in the lane to the immediate right of the double
center line when the defendant's automobile crossed to
the left of the double center line to pass him and went
to the extreme vVest side of the highway by the canal
bridge and then cut back again almost hitting an automobile on the top of the hill. ~Ir. Green observed, when
he reached the top of the hill, that defendanfs automobile
had come back to his o'vn side of the road and that he
then barely edged to the East of the road and then edged
back and cut right into the line of northbound traffic.
He stated that he observed the collision seeing the lights
go out and then sparks and 1nore ligl1ts going out "-i.th
the defendant's car swerving around. Mr. Green stated
that in his opinion the speed of the defendant's automobile 'vas 70 miles per hour or better (R-188-190).
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Mr. Melvin J. Perry testified that he was driving
North on Redwood Road up the South side of Bennion
Hill, in the outside or East lane when a '54 Ford, light
colored, passed him doing a high rate of speed. He further stated that this automobile was over across the
double line a short distance and then proceeded down the
hill coming back into the correct lane and then veered
to the left into collision with a North bound automobile
(R-196-197). He stated (R-197):

"Q. Will you tell us how the collision
A.

happened~

As I say, the Ford just veered over to the
left in the opposite lane of traffic, where I
had a position on the left side of the hill to
view it."

Mr. Perry stated that he was approximately a half block
from the place of the collision when it happened. Mr.
Perry also observed the subsequent collisions which the
Burdette car had with the other North bound cars and
that they were all in the South bound lane. 1-Ie estimated
the speed of the Burdette car as a "high rate of speed"
(R-198-199). Later on on cross examination (R-200) Mr.
Perry stated that the speed was at least 60 miles an hour.
Deputy Sheriff Arthur E. Allen testified that he had
a conversation with the defendant Burdette at the scene
of the accident and that he could smell alcohol on him,
and from his manner of speech and rationalness, he believed him to be intoxicated (R. 148).
Highway Patrolman Vasco Laub testified (R-257)
that he interviewed the defendant at the hospital at approximately 9:00 P.M. on the evening of the accident.
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He testified (R-262) that in his opinion he was under the
influence of alcohol.
Burdette testified that he was traveling about 50
miles an hour coming down the hill on his o'vn side of
the highway and that the oncoming car came into his lane
of traffic and hit him. He further testified that just
prior to the accident Mr. Eyre and Mrs. Massardi started
to argue and further (R-317):

"Q. What happened

then~

A. I turned and asked them to stop it.
Q.

'Vas there any motion?

A.

They were jostling me.

Q.

Did the jostling have any effect on the driving~

A.
Q.

It was interfering, and bothering and I turned
my head and asked them to stop.
Then what happened~

A.

Then I turned and saw the lights commg
to,vard me.

Q.

On 'vhich side were

A.

J.\tiy side.

Q.

Then "That

A.

I had a collision and struck IllY face on the
steering "'heel, that is all I ren~ember.

Q.

At the tirne of the collision~ ''Thich side of the
road were you on, Mr. Burdett?

the~. . on~

happened~

A. On n1y side of the road."
At R. 350 on cross examination the defendant testified as f ollo~rs :
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"Q. It was your testimony, as I understand it,
that this accident happened so quick, when
you first noticed those lights, there was
nothing you could do about it~
A.

That is correct.

Q.

It was too late to do anything at

A.

I tried.

Q.

But it was too

A.

Yes.

Q.

If you had of had time you could have done
something about it~

A.

I suppose I could."

all~

late~

Lorene Massardi remembered nothing concerning
the happening of the accident.
Mr. Burdette also testified that all he had to drink
that night were two short beers consisting of half foam
and half beer of which he had not drunk the complete
glasses. He stated that at the time of the accident he was
sober, and he further testified that there was nothing
concerning the way in which he was driving immediately
prior to the accident to give any cause for concern. He
testified as follows, on cross examination (R-350) :

"Q.

(By Mr. Black) It is also your testimony
is it not, that your driving on the way out
and on the way back was perfectly normal~

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

There is nothing to give anyone any cause for
concern there, was there~

A.

No sir.
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Q.

And, of course there was nothing to give
anyone cause for concern about drinking
either~

A.

No sir."

In regard to the purpose of the trip, Lorene Massardi testified that she and Mr. Eyre had gone to the
B Z B Bar where Mr. Burdette worked as a bartender
and had ordered a glass of beer when Mr. Burdette came
in and sat down at their table (R-229). She stated that
they started talking about chickens and eggs and further
(R-230):

"Q. And then vvhat happened~
A.

Well, we just sat there, and they were talking
about the chickens and eggs~ and I said to Mr.
Eyre, 'we better go get them because it is
getting late, \ve better go and gather up the
eggs, because it is getting late.

Q.

What, if anything, \Yas said about getting
the eggs~

A.

He mentioned so1nething about selling a crate
of eggs, I don't know just how it came about,
but the three bartenders "-ith :\Ir. Burdettt,vo other bar tenders and :\Ir. Burdette "-ere
going to buy a case of eggs for the three of
them.

Q.

vVas

A.

1\Ir. Eyre said he \\-ould sell then1 to him for
less than he got for a case of eg·g·s.
What did Mr. Burdett say?

anything said to :\!r. Burdette about the
price?

~

Q.

A.

..._

He said that \\-ould be a good deal. because
they could use them in the bar.
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happened~

Q.

Then what

A.

vV ell, I don't know just how long we were in
there, "\Ve then started to leave and went outside, and Mr. Eyre and I started to his car,
Mr. Burdett's was parked next to it, I didn't
know at that time Mr. Burdett had a car. He
said to Jack 'let's go in mine,' so we got in
his car and went.

Q.

Then where did you

A.

He said he wanted to go home and change
his clothes, Mr. Eyre said it wouldn't be any
use. Then we started out to the chickens.

Q.

Did you go to the chicken farm~

go~

A. Yes."
And again at R-238:
"Q.

Mrs. Massardi, will you tell me what the purpose of this trip was out to the farm~

A.

Yes. To feed the chickens and gather the
eggs.

Q. All right. Did you hear anything mentioned,
or talked about between Mr. Eyre and Mr.
Burdett, any other reason than that mentioned for going out to the farm~

A.

k

No."

Burdette testified that on the day in question he went
to the BZB bar to see if he was needed for work that
night and saw Mr. Eyre and Mrs. Massardi. He stated
that Mr. Eyre offered to sell him some eggs cheaper
than he could buy them; that Eyre sold eggs by the case
and the other two bartenders agreed to go in on a case
with him. He claimed that the eggs were to be delivered
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by Eyre. However, in explaining why he went outside with
Eyre and Massardi, Burdette, for the first time, claimed
that he was invited by Eyre to see the chicken farm and
went for that reason volunteering to take his car (R-347).
On cross examination Burdette testified as follows
(R-347):

"Q.

Now, Mr. Burdett, it is true, isn't it, that you
only had a casual acquaintance with Mr. Eyre,
is that not true~

A.

Just casual, yes.

Q.

That is of short duration,
known him very long~

A.

Not too long, no sir.

Q.

Just seen him, of course, a couple of times 7

A.

Several times.

Q.

And, of course, there was no reason why you
should just merely desire Mr. Eyre's company, or to be in his company, is that right~

you hadn't

Mr. Strong: \"\That time are you speaking of!
Q.

(By 1\Ir. Black): . A..t the time they went -with
you in your car 1

A.

''Tell, he invited 1ne to go out.

Q.

I see, but the reason you 'vent out 'vas to get
the eggs, "1"asn't it,~

A.

.Not purposely, no.

Q.

A.

Isn't it true you tl1ought this was a pretty
good deal he offered you 1
Yes sir.

Q.

You agreed to buy these eggs f
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A.

Yes sir.

Q. And you talked to the bartender and also the
owner to see if they would cut in on this deal
with you~
A.

He wanted to sell a case of eggs, I couldn't
afford one myself.

Q. He wanted to sell these

eggs~

A. Yes sir.
Q. You wanted them for use in your
A.

home~

Yes sir.

Q. Isn't it true in this other hearing in this matter you said nothing about Mr. Eyre inviting
you to go out to see this farm, did you~
A.

I can't remember.

Q. You can't
A.

remember~

No.

Q. Let's see if I can refresh your memory then.
This is on page 8. It is right near the top~
then~

Q.

What did you do

A.

vVell Mr. Eyre made me a proposition
to buy some eggs. He said he had quite a
few chickens out in Draper, out on a
ranch out there, and he said he would
make me a deal on some eggs and it
sounded all right to me. So I asked Leo if
he would like to buy some.

Q. Asked

who~

A. Leo.

Q. The bartender?
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A.

Yes, sir, and he said 'sure' and Mr. Eyre
said he would like to sell by the case
rather than sell a few dozen eggs. So I
asked Mr. Bolinder and he said he would
be glad to buy a half a case ?f egg~ because he could use them in his business
and in his home.

I believe that is all-did you so testify at
the prior hearing of this matter 1

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

Then it is true, isn't it, that you said nothing
at that prior hearing, at that time about )Ir.
Eyre inviting you just to go out and look
over his ranch'

A.

No sir.

Q.

Is it not true'

A.

No sir. l\fay I have the question

Q.

It is true then at this prior hearing then you
said nothing about Mr. Eyre coming out to
look at this ranch Y

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

At that hearing you testified the purpose, the
sole purpose was to go out and get those
eggs?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

You ren1arked, as l\ rr. 1\IcCn.rtY re1ninded YOU,
you stated in this transeript. you ,vanted to
tell the whole truth, the "~hole storY in this
matter~
·

again~

A. Yes sir."
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Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences
deducible from the foregoing evidence. A jury could well
have found that the 1notivation for the trip was the sale
and purchase of eggs. In order to consummate the sale,
an exchange would have to take place. Burdette would
receive the eggs and Eyre would receive the money.
Presumptively, this exchange would take place at the time
Eyre placed the eggs in the crate and delivered the
crate to Burdette. This exchange could have taken place
either at Eyre's place of business, the tavern, or at the
Burdette home, but this would be immaterial. These men
went out to consummate a business transaction, to wit,
the sale and the purchase of eggs. This was the motivation for the trip, the purpose of the trip, and it was
in the execution of this purpose that the collision occurred. The mutual obligations and advantages of any
sale of property were present in the transaction here
involved. This was not a sightseeing tour, this was not
a social venture, but on the contrary was a business
transaction as will be hereinafter clearly indicated by
citation of numerous authorities. These facts taken in
a light most favorable to plaintiff clearly established
that the deceased Eyre was a passenger and not a
guest of Burdette at the time of the collision. Yet,
the trial court not only failed to instruct that Eyre was
a passenger but refused to even submit the passengerguest issue to the jury as an issue of fact. It instructed
that Eyre was a guest.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT 'COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DECEASED, CECIL
DREWERY EYRE WAS A GUEST IN THE AUTOMOBILE
BEING DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT MICHAEL FRANK
BURDETT.
POINT II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 INCORRE·CTLY ALLOWED THE
JURY TO CONSIDER ALLEGED SCUFFLING BY DECEDENT AND ANOTHER OCCUPANT AS A DEFENSE WHEN
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY ELIMINATED IT AS A
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON NEGLIGENCE AFTER HAVING ELIMINATED
NEGLIGENCE FROM THE LAWSUIT.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL ·COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 6 WHICH STATED THAT
DRIVING A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF LIQUOR IS NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAWTHIS AFTER HAVING ELIMINATED NEGLIGENCE AS
BEING A·CTIONABLE.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN ALLOWING THE DEFENSE OF ASSUl\fPTION OF RISK
TO BE GIVEN THE JURY, AND COMPOUNDED ITS ERROR
IN UNDULY ElVfPHASIZING THIS DEFENSE IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTOR1- NEGLIGENCE IS A DESponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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15
FENSE TO AN ACTION BASED ON WILFUL
AND INTOXICATION.

MIS~CONDUCT

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DECEASED, CECIL
DREWERY EYRE WAS A GUEST IN THE AUTOMOBILE
BEING DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT MICHAEL FRANK
BURDETT.

In his instruction No. 10 the Trial Court stated as
follows: (R. 79)
"You are instructed as a 1natter of law that
the deceased Eyre was riding as a guest passenger
in defendant's vehicle at the time and place of
the accident."
The court went on to instruct that the lawsuit of the
estate of Cecil Drewery Eyre was based on allegations
of wilful misconduct and intoxication of the defendant.
(Instructions Nos. 7 and 16). Plaintiff requested in the
alternative, instructions both that the deceased Cecil
Drewery Eyre was a passenger as a matter of law (R.
40) and leaving the question of whether the deceased
was a guest or a passenger for the jury to determine
(R. 46).
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
committed reversible error in holding as a matter of
law that the deceased was a guest, according to the clear
line of authorities to which this Court has committed
itself. The only Utah case dealing with the question of
whether an occupant is a guest or a passenger is the case
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of Jensen vs. Mower (1956) 294 P. 2d 683, 4 U 2d 336.
rr,his court held under the facts of that case that the
plaintiff was a passenger and not a guest. In its opinion
this court relied heavily on the California case inasmuch
as the Guest Statute in California is substantially the
same as the one in Utah. On page 688, the Court quotes
from the leading California case of Whit1nore vs. French,
(1951) 235 P. 2d 3, which in turn cites the case of Kruzie
vs. Sanders (1943) 143 P 2d 704. The following language
is stated from the Whitmore case:

"Where, however, the driver receives a tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a
motivating influence for furnishing the transportation, the rider is a passenger and the driver is
liable for ordinary negligence."
The K ruzie case, supra, is one of the leading cases
In California. In that case, the parties had been acquainted for some tin1e, the defendants occasionally
taking meals at a cafe operated by plaintiffs. In December, 1940, Mrs. Kruzie, the plaintiff~ ''as asked b·y ~Irs.
Sanders, the defendant, to go with her to Fresno to
assist her with some Christmas shopping. The defendant told the plaintiff that she "ranted her advice in the
selection of a ring as a present for defendanfs husband
and also for her help in choosing presents for son1e
girls. The plaintiff had no special kno"~Iedge of the
jewelry business but she had good taste and she kne"\v
"the sizes· and different things" appropriate as presents
for the girls. After nearly a "\veek's urging plaintiff
"vent with defendant, the plaintiff having done her ~hop-
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ping at a prior time. The trial court granted a non-suit
against plaintiffs, and plaintiffs appealed on the question
of whether plaintiff was a guest or a passenger. In
rendering its decision the court stated at p. 706:
"It is settled that benefits to the driver other
than cash or its equivalent may be 'compensation'
(citing cases). In the Druzanich case the sole
benefit received by the driver was the promise
of the passenger to share in the driving. In Haney
v. Takakura, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1, 37 P 2d 170, 38
P 2d 160, cited with approval in the Druzanich
case, compensation was found where the defendant driver asked the plaintiff to accompany him
into town to assist in selling oranges. In the
present case the evidence that plaintiff took the
trip at defendant's request in order to aid defendant with her Christmas shopping clearly shows a
substantial benefit to defendant within the Druzanich and Haney decisions. * * *
"Although Section 403 of the Vehicle Code
defines a guest as a person who accepts a ride
'without giving compensation for such ride,' it is
not necessary, in order to avoid the prohibition
of the statute, for plaintiff to establish that the
compensation received by the driver was given
'for such ride' in the sense that plaintiff obtained
or purchased transportation for some independent
purpose of her own. Where the trip was not
primarily for a social purpose, it is sufficient
to show that defendant was to derive a substantial benefit from the transportation of plaintiff,
and the fact that plaintiff received no benefit
therefrom is immaterial. Guest statutes must be
interpreted in accordance with the intention of
the Legislature. A primary policy underlying
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these statutes is to prevent recovery f?r ordinary
negligence by a guest in an automobile wh? has
accepted the hospitality of the owner or driver."
In discussing the legislative purpose of the Guest
Statute, this ·court, in the' J~nsen case, cited the following
language from the case of Crawford vs. Foster, (Cal.
1930), 293 P 841, at page 687:
"The purpose and object that the Legislature
had in mind sometimes throws light upon the
meaning of the language used. The situation that
this section was apparently designed to prevent
is well lrnown. As the use of automobiles became
almost universal, the proverbial ingratitude of
the dog that bites the hand that feeds him, found
a counterpart in the many cases that arose, where
generous drivers, having offered rides to guests,
later found themselves defendants in cases that
often turned upon close questions of negligence.
Undoubtedly, the Legislature, in adopting this
act, reflected a certain natural feeling as to the
injustice of such a situation. Neither this feeling
nor the reasons therefor apply to a s-ituation
arising out of an ordinary busi·ness transaction,
.
* * *"
The Crawford case involved a situation where the
plaintiff 'vas being taken for a de1uonstration ride byan agent of the defendant auton1obile dealer. The court
in that case pointed out that the definition iu the statute
does not say "'vithout pa~~ing therefor" but rather says
''without giving colnpensation therefor" and that this
language 'indicates an intention not to li1nit the srune to
·a person definitely and specifically paying cash or its
·equivalent for his transportation but to include in its
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scope a person who gives such recompense for the ride
as may be regarded as compensation therefor; that is,
a return which may make it worth the other's while to
furnish the ride. The court states :
"A consideration may be any benefit conferred or any prejudice suffered."
In defining a guest the court stated:
"We think the meaning of the language used
is that a guest is one who is invited, either directly or by implication, to enjoy the hospitality
of a driver of a car; who accepts such hospitality;
and who takes a ride either for his own pleasure
or on his own business, without making any return to or conferring any benefit upon the driver
of the car, other than the mere pleasure of his
company."
The California cases have distinguished a situation
'vhere one of the objects of the trip is business from a
situation where the trip is purely social. It was stated
in the case of Whitechat v. Guyette, (Cal. 1942), 122 P
2d 47, at page 49:
"On the other hand, if the parties are engaged
in a business venture for their mutual advantage
and the ride is an integral part of that business
venture, then the driver may be said to be in
receipt of benefits sufficient to be classified as
compensation, and the occupant becomes 'passenger,' who may recover for injuries suffered
as a result of the negligence of the driver.''
This case involved a situation where the purpose of the
trip was to take the occupants to a meeting of an
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organization, the driver receiving money from the organization to cover the costs of the trip.
In the case of Druzanich v. Oriley, (Cal. 1942) 122
P. 2d 53, the driver and other occupants were delegates
from a Union going to a convention. The defendant's
husband allowed her to use the car if the otl1ers would
help in driving which they agreed to do. The court held
that the appellant's promise "\vas the "special tangible
benefit" which was the "motivating influence for furnishing the transportation" and that this must be termed
compensation. The court stated:
"The instant case cannot be distinguished
from the case of Lerma v. Flores, 60 P 2d 546,
wherein the plaintiff was invited b~~ the defendant to ride with him so that he (plaintiff) might
show the defendant which route they should follow, nor does it differ materially from the case
of Haney vs. Takakura, 2 Cal. ..._-\._pp. :2d 1~ 37 P
2d 170, in "\vhich the plaintiff, \\Tho had experience
in selling oranges, "\vas asked to accompany the
defendant driver into town to aid the defendant
in selling his crop of oranges.~,
The case of Walker cs. Ada1nson (Cal. 1937)~ 70 P.
2d 914, involved a situation " . .here the plaintiff and
defendant " . .ere business associates, having purchased
real property at Lake Tahoe \\-i th t"-o n1ain houses and
guest cottages, \\. .hich the~. . rented out and in ,vlrich they
djvided the profits and shared the expenses. The purpose
of the trip in question 'Yas to take hard"-are and other
1naterials to carpenters 'vho " . . ere doing construction
vvork on the property. The. defendant took }1is ear and
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the plaintiff furnished some money for expenses. It was
held that the evidence supported the verdict for the
plaintiff on the theory that the parties were engaged
on a business venture for their mutual advantage and
that plaintiff was, therefore, a person who had given
compensation for the transportation and not a guest.
The case of Duclos v. Tashjian, Dist. Ct. of App.
4th Dist. Cal. 1939, 90 P 2d 140, involved a situation
where the deceased was an expert machinist and plain~
tiff owned a farm a short distance away. On the day
in question the plaintiff came to deceased's place of
business and asked him to come to his farm to look at
his pump and see if he could fix it. The deceased took
his tools and went with the defendant. The court held
that the deceased was not a guest stating at page 143:
"The journey was not undertaken by Tashjian as an act of hospitality nor as a favor, but
as a real and vital part of his own business with
an eye to his own benefit. It was participated in
by Duclos, not as a means of obtaining free transportation, but as an integral part of a business
transaction. * * *.

1'

l

"An actual contract of employment of Duclos
by Tashijian was no more necessary to constitute
compensation for the ride in his car than was
an actual sale of an automobile necessary in the
Crawford case. Because some benefit from the
trip may accrue to the rider iJs not controllivng.
The statute does not so provide. A. prospective
benefit to the rider does not compensate and destroy by balancing an independent and separate
compensation for the ride given by the rider to
the driver. It is sufficient if, as here, the person
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who accepts the ride gives compensation to the
driver for it."
The foregoing language shows that it is immaterial
whether or not the passenger r~ceives any benefit from
the ride. The controlling factor is whether or not the
driver receives a benefit as defined in the cases. Furthermore the California cases indicate that in any business
type situation there is a benefit within the Statute
sufficient to make the occupant a passenger and not
a guest.
The case of Follansbee v. Benzenberg, Dist. Ct. App.
2nd Dist. Div. 3. Cal. 1954, 265 P 2d 183, involved a
situation where the hope of future business was held
to be a present consideration sufficient to take the occupant out of the guest status. In this case decedent bought
a car from the defendant and the defendant's servant
was taking the decedent to get his license plates. The
court stated at page 186:
'•An opportunity thus obtained is a direct and
substantial benefit, and may "~en be as beneficial
to the driver where he is selling something not
necessarily connected "Tith the ride as "There he
is de1nonstrating the car itself to a prospective
purchaser or using it to take a prospect to look
at a piece of land. The hope of future business
is present, and such an opportunity is a real
benefit to a salesn1an even though another place
for his labors n1ight have been chosen. ~ ~ ~
It is enough that tlzerc is 'any· consideration for
the ride."
.

In the case of Gilles pie v. Rau~li ngs (Cal. 1957),
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ant real estate broker as a receptionist and clerk for
approximately four months. There was evidence that
defendant 'vanted plaintiff to learn more about the business so that she cpuld talk intelligently with customers.
One of the objects of the trip in question was to see
some real estate in another town. The defendant told
the plaintiff that he wanted her to come on the trip.
The defendant further testified that although he planned
to see the property the purpose of the trip was primarily
for pleasure. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed, the court holding that the jury properly decided
that the purpose of plaintiff being in the car was to
familiarize herself with the business and that she accepted the ride because of the employment relationship.
See the following additional California cases which
substantiate the foregoing propositions:

Sumner v. Edmunds, 21 P. 2d 159, plaintiff being
driven over paper route for purpose of familiarizing
himself therewith-no contract of employment had been
entered into-·held not a guest.
Boysen v. Porter et al, Dist. Ct. of App. 2nd Dist.,
Div. 1, 1935, 52 P 2d 482-employee of committee to elect
mayoralty candidate,-to which committee, owner lent
~ruck and driver who operated in accordance with employee's directions-held not a guest.
C.arey vs. City of Oakland, (Cal. 1941) 112 P 2d
714-plaintiff was riding in the City ambulance to assist
in· caring for an injured friend being taken to the hospital-held evidence susceptible of the inference that
the motivating influence which induced the officer in
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charge of the ambulance to allow Mrs. Carey to go along
and which prompted her to make the request was that
she could and would render a beneficial service in assisting him in caring for the unconcious Mrs. Gordon on
the way to the hospital. The court cites the follo,ving
at page 716:

"In the case of McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.
2d 279, 70 P 2d 909, the court in reviewing the
origin, purpose and the construction place upon
the operation of said law clearly points out, first,
that such statutes, depriving a person carried
without reward of the right to recover damages
for injuries caused by failure to exercise ordinary care, are in derogation of the common law,
and therefore must not only be construed strictly
against the change but its operation should not
be extended beyond the correction of the evils
and the attain1nent of the permissible social objects \vhich \Vere the inducing reasons for its
enactment·"

'

Jensen vs. Hansen, Dist. Ct. of ..._\_pp. Fourth Dist.
Cal. 1936, 55 P. 2d 1201 - Deceased riding ''ith defendant - they and one other ''"·ere appraisers hired by· a
loan company all three of "~hich had to 1nake any appraisal. Frequently they "\vent together to see properties
in the car of one or the other. Held-deceased not a quest
since appraisals had to be signed by all and they had
a good deal of appraisals that day and co1npensation
could not be received until all three had signed. The
presence of the three appraisers conferred a benefit on
each of the1n by enabling all of thenz to receh·e their
compensation 1nore prouzptly.
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Martinez v. So. Pac. Co., (Cal. 1955) 288 P 2d 868.
Action by daughter and daughter-in-law against father
and minor son who was driving. Evidence showed that
they all lived together as a family unit, the members
contributing part of their wages to a common fund. The
plaintiffs worked at a packing plant. They had a ride
to work every 1norning which was stopped, and from
that time on various members of the family group drove
then1 to work. Held - sufficient evidence to justify a
finding by the jury that they were passengers and not
guests.
Roberts v. Craig, Dist. Ct. of App. 1st Dist. Div. 1,
Cal. 1954, 268 P. 2d 500 - Defendant had a limited
instruction permit - law required her to have licensed
driver in car when she drove - defendant wanted to
drive to Martinez to pick up husband's salary checks asked plaintiff, a licensed driver to go with her- plaintiff had no business there. Held - jury justified in
finding plaintiff a passenger.
Thompson v. Lacey, (Cal., 1954) 267 P. 2d 4.
JJ1alloy v. Fang (Cal., 1951) 232 P. 2d 241.
Fachadio v. K rovitz, Dist. Ct. of App. 1st Dist.
Div. 2, Cal. 1944, 144 P. 2d 646.
The following cases from other jurisdictions are
cited for the assistance of the court:
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stitzel, (1942) (Ind.) 41
~.E. 2d 133 Complaint alleged that plaintiff, a salesman for a furniture store, was riding with the defendant
for the purpose of conducting her to a wholesale furniture mart and helping her to select furniture, which
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would then be sold to her by the plaintiff's employerheld - could not be said as a matter of law that this
was not such ~ substantial, material benefit to her as to
pay her for plaintiff's transportation.

Zaso vs. De Cola (Ohio) 51 NE 2 654-Defendant
requested plaintiff, his sister, to come to his house to
try to make peace for him with his wife - after she
failed he was taking her home - held - benefit was
tangible.
Russell v. Pilget· (Vermont) 37 A 2d 403- Officer
of law riding on defendant's milk truck to protect him
during milk strike - held - passenger for hire.
Scholz v. Leuer, (Wash.), 109 P. 2d 294- Plaintiff's
decedent accompanied defendant on early morning delivery trip principally to help him by reading names
of customers - fact that she wanted to go and that
she might have regarded the venture as a lark, ''as
said to be of little moment - held, substantial benefit
to constitute payment.
Cardinal v. Reinecke (~Iich.), 273 N\Y. 330--plaintiff
in defendant's car at her request to advise defendant's
daughter upon prospective en1ploy111ent - held - passenger for hire.
Goldberg v. Cook (1\finn.) 289 N\V'" 512 - 1nother
traveling with daughter to '':rest Coast " . .here daughter
planning to set up ne'\\r home - mother can1e solely to
help daughter find a place and arrange it _ held _
passenger for hire.
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Delk v. Young (Ohio) 35 NE ·2d · 969 - occupant
-vvent. with driver who was a candidate for public office,
to a meeting where they hoped to advance his candidacy
- held - passenger for hire.
O'Hagan v. Byron (Pa.) 33 A 2d 779 - plaintiff
went with defendant, her sister, at defendant's request
so. that she might give her opinion as to the health of
their brother.-. held-· passenger for hire.
Elkins v. Foster, (Texas) 101 SW 2 297- plaintiff
accompanied defendant in defendant's car at defendant's
request in order to discuss plain~iff's efforts to aid
defendant's brother in retaini~g a position which would
be of financial benefit· to ·defendant - held - passenger
for hire~
Nyberg v. Kirby (Nev.) 188 P. 2d 1006- Plaintiff
was requested to accompany defendant on trip to get
supplies because defendant had been ill the same morning - held - not a guest - compensation even though
plaintiff had actually performed little or nothing in the
-vvay of services.
Porter ·v. Tecker (Iowa), 270 NW 897- defendant
asked plaintiff to accompany him to help load and unload truck - defendant injured on return trip - held
-for jury.

·ti

Wittrock v. Newcom (Iowa) 277 NW 286- defendant demonstrating car to plaintiff's · brother requested
plaintiff to come along to as.sist in ·selling car -· held passenger for hire.
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Mitchell v. Heaton (Iowa) 1 NW 2d 284- plaintiff
"'. .ent with defendant because plaintiff's brother to whom
defendant wished to sell a tractor refused to negotiate
unless plaintiff was brought along - held - pa~senger
for hire.
Albrecht v. Safeway Stores (Ore.) (1938) 80 P. 2d
62 - defendant was a district manager of defendant
Safeway Stores- had to make inspection trips- asked
plaintiff his brother-in-law to go on trip with him that he might need some help in driving - plaintiff did
assist in driving and in loading sacks of salt in car held - jury question.
Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead (Ohio) (1938)~
14 N.E. 211 - defendant driving to see a man on
business, stopped in village - asked deceased and an-.
other to ride "\\rith him to show him "There man livedheld-defendant cannot claim the protection of Guest
Statute.
George v. Stanfield, et al (D. C. Idaho) ( S. D.~
1940) 33 F. Supp. 486 - defendant, a stock n1an~ asked
plaintiff to go with hun to help lilln find the place
where defendant wanted to go on business - held payment does not mean mone·y· or perfor1uance of a
pecuniary obligation - not a guest either under Oreo-on
0
or Idaho Statutes.
Palmer v. ll1illet·, 35 NE 2 104.
Bailey v. Neale (Ohio), 25 NE 2310.
Forsling v. lJ!ickelson (S. D.), 283 N\\. . 169.
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Van A1lker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co.
(Neb.) 8 N.W. 2d 451.
Lloyd v. Mowery (Wash.) (1930) 290 P. 710.
Thompson v. Farrand (Iowa) (1933) 251 NW. 44.
Bree v. Lamb (Conn. 1935) 178 A 919.
Applying the law as set forth in the foregoing cases
it can readily be seen that the trial court committed
reversible error in holding as a matter of law that the
deceased Cecil Drewery Eyre was a guest and; not a
passenger. The evidence shows without dispute that the
deceased who operated a chicken farm in Draper, Utah,
consummated a sale of a case of eggs to the defendant.
Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the primary purpose of the trip to Draper was
to pick up the eggs which had been sold to the defendant,
and to bring them back to the B Z B lounge. Certainly,
this vvas a mutual business transaction whereby the
deceased was selling and defendant was buying the eggs
in question. The evidence shows that the defendant was
getting a good price on the eggs, and certainly, getting
the eggs that night and at that pri·ce w,as substantial
enough benefit for defendant to have considered it worth
his time in driving out to the farm to get said eggs. It
will be remembered that the evidence showed defendant
and deceased had merely a slight acquaintance and that
there was no social purpose whatsoever in the trip in
question. Defendant stated at the trial that he was interested in going out to see the farm, although at the
former hearing referred to in the record, defendant had
made no such statement at all. It cannot be argued that
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in such a transaction the buyer does not · benefit as
well as the seller. In every sale of any type of product,
it goes without saying, that both the seller and the buyer
.benefit. Oth~rwise, there would be no buyers. It can be
pointed out as an illustration of this., that as a matter
of common knowledge, persons will travel many miles
to participate in a bargain sale. Also, the hoards of
people converging on the doors of department stores
on mornings before sales can verify this well known
fact. It cannot be said as a matter of law that there
was no benefit accruing to the defendant in the trip in
question. Maybe the jury could have found that these
men put the egg transation off in some corner and
decided as a purely collateral venture to go on an evening
sightseeing tour of Eyre's hen yard. But we suggest to
this Honorable Court that such a conclusion, to say the
least, is some"\vhat unreasonable.
It is of no n1oment in determining whether or not
the decedent Eyre is a passenger, to state that he also
benefited fron1 the trip. As "\\ras pointed out by the fore-·
going authorities, the one and onl)~ question involved
is whether or not the defendant Burdette benefitted from
the trip. The cases clearly hold that in a business transaction where there is a Inutual benefit "·e do not have
a. guest relationship.
It will be remembered that the purpose of the guest
statute was to prevent generous drivers giving rides
to guests fro1n being sued for negligence. It "ill also
be re1ne1nbered that since the guest statute is an abrogation of co1mnon la"\v and takes rights a"\vay fro 1n perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sons which they had at common law, that it must be
construed strictly within its narrow purpose.
It was a gross injustice for the trial court in the
case at bar to take away from the jury the question
of whether or not the defendant Burdette benefitted from
the trip in question and deciding as a matter of law
that he did not. This was something which the trial court
decided, on which all reasonable men could not agree.
Many of the foregoing cases cited to this court for its
assistance, contained instances where the benefits were
less tangible than were the benefits in the case at bar.
POINT II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 INCORRE·CTLY ALLOWED THE
JURY TO CONSIDER ALLEGED SCUFFLING BY DECEDENT AND ANOTHER OCCUPANT AS A DEFENSE WHEN
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY ELIMINATED IT AS A
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

Instruction No. 15 given by the court states as follows (R. 84) :
"If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence in this case that at or immediately prior
to the time of the collision, the plaintiff Massardi
and the deceased Eyre were so conducting themselves as to interfere with the proper operation
of the vehicle by the defendant Burdette and that
such conduct on their part was a proximate contributing cause of the accident, then and in that
event you are instructed that the plaintiffs cannot
recover and your verdict must be in favor of t4~
defendant and against both plaintiffs, no cause
of action."
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It will be remembered that the defendant Burdette
testified that the accident happened on his side of the
highway with the oncoming car coming across and into
the car he was driving. In addition to this, on cross
examination (R. 350) the defendant testified as follows:

"Q. It was your testimony, as I understand it,
that this accident happened so quick, when
you first noticed these lights, there was nothing you could do about it~

A.

That is correct.

Q.

It was too late to do anything at all?

A.

I tried.

Q.

But it was too

late~

A. Yes.
Q. If you had of had tin1e you could have done
something about it!
A.

I suppose I could."

According to the defendant's own testimony the
alleged scuffling that he spoke about could ha-ve had
nothing whatsoever to do 'ritl1 tl1e l1appening of the
accident. In the first place, the defendant testified that
the accident happened on his side of the higlT\\Tay. Therefore, there is nothing that the t""'"o occupants of the
auton1obile could have done to have caused l1iln to go
on to the wrong side of the higlr\vay. In the second
place, the defendant states that the onco1uing car turned
into his car so suddenly that he did not have time to
attempt to do anything about it. Therefore, according
to defendant's own testimony there is nothing that the
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two occupants of the automobile could have done to
have prevented him from avoiding the accident. Certainly, it is well established law that a party's testimony
is no stronger than its weakest link. The defendant is
bound by his own testimony and his case must stand
or fall with it. It will be remembered also that the
only testimony in the entire record concerning any scuffling by the two occupants was the testimony of the
defendant himself. Then, the defendant went on to testify
that there was nothing that this alleged scuffling could
have had to do with the cause of the accident. For this
reason, the instruction given as aforesaid by the trial
court was prejudicial error, since it was not justified
according to the evidence in the case.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON NEGLIGENCE AF'TER HAVING ELIMINATED
NEGLIGENCE FROM THE LAWSUIT.

After the trial court had eliminated any question of
negligence from the lawsuit by ruling and instructing
as a matter of law that the deceased Cecil Drewery Eyre
was a guest and not a passenger, it went on to give
the following instructions, Instruction No. 4 in part
(R. 72) :
"The terms 'negligence,' 'contributory negligence,' 'ordinary care,' and 'proximate cause,' as
used in these instructions, are defined as follows :
(a) ~Negligence' means the failure to do what
a reasonably prudent person would have
done under the circumstances of a situaation, or doing what such person under
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such existing circumstances would not
have done. The essence of the fault may
lie in acting or omitting to act. The .duty
is dictated and measured by the e:ngencies of the occasion ;''
Instruction No. 7 in part (R. 75) :
"Under the law of the State of Utah at the
time of the accident in question, it was the duty
of a driver of a motor vehicle to keep a lookout
for other vehicles or conditions reasonably to be
anticipated upon the highway, to keep his car at
all times under reasonably safe and proper control, to drive his car on his own right side of
the highway, and to maintain a speed -within that
set by law for any particular locality. A violation
of any one or more of these requirements would
constitute negligence on the part of the driver.
"To prevail on a claim of "Wilful misconduct
on the part of the defendant, the plaintiffs have
the burden of showing to you by a preponderance
of the evidence, that such act or acts of negligence as referred to above were committed under
such circumstances as to constitute "ilful misconduct. In this connection -vou are directed to
the definition of wilful 1nis~onduct given in instruction No. 5."
Instruction No. 11 (R. 80) :
"Con~uct arising fron1 1110111entary thought-

lessness, 1nadve:r-tence, or fro1n error of judg1nent
does not, standing alone, indicate "?ilful Inisconduct. If, t_herefo~e, y~u find fron1 a preponderance
of the eVIdence 1n this case that the accident was
caused by nothing Inore than the defendant's
momenta~y thoughtlessness, inadvertence, 0 r
error of JUdgment, there can be no recoverv
.. and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35

your verdict should be in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action."
Instruction No. 16 (R. 85) :
"Even should you find from a preponderance
of the evidence in this case that the defendant
was negligent and that such negligence 'vas a
proximate cause of the accident, the court instructs you that such evidence alone is not sufficient. In this case you must find either that the
defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct or was
intoxicated as defined in these instructions, and
that such wilful misconduct or intoxication proximately caused the accident. If all you find is
that the defendant was guilty ·of negligence, your
verdict must be in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action."
It is well established in Utah as well as in other
States that it is error to give instructions which are
extraneous to the issues and evidence in the case. .After
eliminating negligence from the case, it was improper
for the trial court to dwell at great length, as he did,
in instructing the jury as to what negligence was. The
only two issues remaining in the case were wilful misconduct and driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. The case of Moore v. D g. R. G. W. (1956) 4 U.
2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849, in discussing two instructions
given in said case, one, to the effect that since this was
an F.E.L.A. case that the plaintiff was not covered by
Workmen's Compensation, and two, that plaintiff -did
not assume the risk, stated that though the statements
of law contained in said instructions were correct, they
were extraneous to the issues of the case and it was
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error to give them. The court in the Moore case cited
the case of Parker vs. Bamberger, et al, (1941) 100 U.
361, 116 P. 2d 425, where it was stated at page 430:
"As to the first point, it is error for the
trial court to give an instruction, though such
instruction correctly states the la-,v, on a matter
extraneous to the issues and evidence of the case."
Also, cited in the Moore case was tl1e case of Bruner
vs. McCarthy, 105 U. 399, 142 P. 2d 649.
It will be observed from the foregoing instructions
that the court, in instructing on negligence and repeatedly stating that the plaintiffs had to prove more than
mere negligence, made the burden of the plaintiffs in
the case seem almost insurmountable. In the first part
of Instruction No. 7 the court stated:
"Under our la"· a guest cannot recover fro1n
his host driver for 1nere negligence, that is~ the
failure to exercise ordinary care in the operation
of a vehicle. Before a guest can recover, he or
she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the driver 'vas guilty of wilful misconduct or of being intoxicated "~hich proxiluately
caused the injury co1nplained of.~~
Certainly, this part of Instruction No. 7 "·as entirely
sufficient to instruct the jury that a quest cannot recove1·
for mere negligence. Subsequent to this it ,vas only
necessary for the court to instruct the jury as to "~hat
they must find to find 'vilful 1nisconduct or intoxication.
However, the court \Yent on to confuse the jury by stating
at great length what negligence 'vas under certain conditions and then to instruct the jury that they must find
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more than this in order to hold for the plaintiffs. This
created confusion and misunderstanding in the mind of
the jury and was extremely prejudicial to plaintiff.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 6 WHICH STATED THAT
DRIVING A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF LIQUOR IS NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAWTHIS AFTER HAVING ELIMINATED NEGLIGENCE AS
BEING ACTIONABLE.

The argument under this point is based on the same
law as was cited under the preceding point but it was
felt necessary to deal with this error by the trial court
separately. The trial court instructed in Instruction
No. 6 (R. 74) as follows:
"A person who drives a vehicle upon a public
highway while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor is guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
One is under the influence of intoxicating liquor
when, as the result of drinking thereof, his abilities of perception, coordination, or of will or
judg1nent, are so affected as to impair, to an
appreciable degree, his ability to operate the
vehicle with a degree of care which an ordinary
prudent person in full possession of his faculties
would exercise under similar circumstances."
It can be seen from the foregoing instruction that
the trial court has added to the confusion which he had
created by delving into the question of negligence by
instructing that a person driving a vehicle under the
influence of intoxicating liquor is guilty of negligence
as a matter of law. The court failed to state that the
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,plaintiffs would be entitled to recover if such a finding
''Tere made. Irreparable prejudice was created for the
plaintiff when this instruction is considered with the
other instructions which emphatically emphasize that
plaintiff could not recover for mere negligence.
The trial court emphatically instructed the jury
that plaintiff could not recover for mere negligence.
The court then instructed the jury that driving while
under the influence of intoxicants "is negligence as a
matter of law." If driving while under the influence
of intoxicants is negligence as a matter of law and the
plaintiff cannot recover for mere negligence then the
plaintiff cannot recover under the court's instructions
even though plaintiff proves that defendant was driving
while under the influence of intoxicants and that his
conduct in such regard proximately caused the collision.

At no place in the instructions is the jury clearly
advised that if defendant 'vas driving while under the
influence of intoxicants and his conduct in that regard
proximately caused the collision plaintiff would be entitled to recover. The only portion of Instruction No.
16 discussing the subject states: .. In this case you 1nust
find either that the defendant "~as guilty of wilful Inisconduct or "ras intoxicated as defined in these instructions, and that such "'"illful 1uisconduct or intoxication
proximately caused the accident." This portion of the
instruction does not advise the jury that plaintiff is
entitled to recover on proof of intoxication and causation.
But even if such an inference were deducible from said
language standing alone that meaning is lost " . hen the
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court advises the jury in the same instruction "If all
you find is that the defendant was guilty of negligence,
your verdict must be in favor of the defendant * * *."
_..._t\..nd, of course, the jury had previously been instructed
that driving while under the influence of intoxicants was
"negligence as a matter of la \V ."
Further1nore, it is not incumbent upon the plaintiff
to establish that the meaning hereinabove set forth is
the only meaning that could be attached to the instructions. It is only incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that said meaning could have been given the
instructions by the jury. It is so obvious as to be beyond
the possibility of dispute that the jury could have believed fron1 the instructions that driving while under
the influence of intoxicants is negligence and that for
mere negligence plaintiff 'vould not be entitled to recover.
It is true that part of this instruction was contained in plaintiff's requested instruction No. 9 (R. 50).
However, a note was appended to said request (R. 51)
which stated:
'"NOTE : This instruction to be given if the
Court leaves the question of whether Eyre was a
guest or a passenger to the jury."
Certainly, with negligence having been eliminated from
the case, the foregoing instruction was extraneous to
the issues and created irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff 'vhich constituted reversible error by the trial court.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REV-ERSIBLE ERROR
IN ALLOWING THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
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TO BE GIVEN THE JURY, AND COMPOUNDED ITS ERROR
IN UNDULY EMPHASIZING THIS DEFENSE IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS.

The defense of assumption of risk has been defined
at 15 A.L.R. 2d 1180, as follows :
"The necessary elements of assumption of
risk by the guest have been clearly defined as
follows:
"First, there 1nust be a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the guest; Second,
the guest must have a knowledge and appreciation of the hazards ; and Third, there must be acquiescence or willingness on the part of the guest
to proceed in the face of danger. Knipfer v. Shaw
(1933) 210 Wis. 617, 246 N\\"'" 328, 2-!7 XW 320."
In this regard it will be remembered that the defendant Burdette testified that he was perfectly sober
throughout the trip in question, having had nothing
more than two short beers at the B Z B bar before
leaving on the trip in question and that said short
beers consisted of half foan1 and half beer and that he
had not finished either one of the1n. The only other
witness, Lorene ~lassardi, stated that she sa"~ Burdette
take two drinks fro1n a glass about four inches tall
approximately half full and that she could not tell
whether it was "~hiskey or beer (R. 2-!2). Sh~ further
testified that during the trip she did not see anyone
in the car take any drinks (R. 244). l\Irs. :Jiassardi had
no n1e1nory of the events iinmediately preceding the
accident (R. 247). She ren1embered that at one point
Mr. Burdette had driven too fast and that she had
objected and that they had stopped at a filling station
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and Burdette had stated that he wouldn't drive so fast,
but she is quite hazy as to when and where this happened
(R. 231, 247). It will also be remembered that the total
evidence in the record as to the manner in which Burdette
was driving prior to the accident covered his driving
from the bottom of Bennion Hill on the South up and
over the hill to the point of the accident. There is no evidence in the record as to any reckless or heedless driving
prior to that time.
There is also testimony in the record by defendant
Burdette and Lorene Massardi to the effect that deceased Eyre and Massardi had consumed a fair amount
of liquor during the afternoon and evening preceding
the accident (R. 241, 300, 304, 306, 310). With the record
in this state, the trial court gave the following instructions:
"Instruction No. 12 (R. 81)
"If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant was guilty of wilful
misconduct as herein defined, you will be required
to determine whether the plaintiffs voluntarily
assumed the risk of such misconduct of the defendant. If so, they are barred from recovering in
this action. In making such determination you will
bear in mind that there must be a knowing concurrence by them in the wilfulness of the driver's
conduct and a knowing acceptance of the hazard.
In other words, the guest, to be barred from
recovery under this rule, must have knowledge
at the time of the ride, of the facts that make
it perilous and must have sufficient experience
and understanding to appreciate the dangerous
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

character of the conduct and with this knowledge
and appreciation, they nevertheless a~sumed the
risk incident to the driver's wilful misconduct."
"Instruction No. 13 (R. 82)
"There is a legal principle connnonly referred
to by the term 'assumption of risk' \vhich is as
follows:
"One is said to assume a risk when he voluntarily manifests his assent to dangerous conduct
or to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous
condition and voluntarily exposes himself to that
danger, or when he knows, or in the exercise of
ordinary care should know, that a danger exists
in either the conduct or condition of another,
or in the condition, use or operation of property
and voluntarily places himself or remains within
the position of danger.
"One \vho has thus assUllled a risk is not
entitled to recover for da1nage caused lrin1 without intention and "-hich results from the dangerous condition or conduct to "'"hich he thus exposed
himself."
"Instruction No. 14 (R. 83)
''When upon entering a vehicle to accept a
ride as a guest one knozcs, or reasonably should
knou·., that the driver is i·nto:ricated. the law holds
that the guest assu1nes the hazard and, therefore,
1nay not recover in the eYent of injury or death
resulting fron1 the driYer·s intoxication. The sa1ne
result also follo'\\"S "-hen, after having entered a
vehicle, a guest learns, or reasonablY should be
aware, that the driver is intoxicat~d and the
guest having a reasonable opportunity' to alight
at a reasonably safe place, fails to do so thus
voluntarily accepting the risks incident
the
driver's
intoxication h~.. continuinoto ride ,Yith
b
. ,,
lUll.
,
1

to
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The evidence conclusively shows that the decedent
Eyre had no notice of drinking on the part of Burdette
or of any wilful 1nisconduct in driving the automobile
prior to the time when the defendant commenced the
wild ride over Bennion Hill at which time it was entirely
too late to make any protest or to get out of the automobile. It will also be remembered that Burdette testified
under oath that he 'vas absolutely sober. For the defendant Burdette to avail himself of the defense of assumption of risk as to his intoxication he must take a
position that he may avail himself of his own perjury
and benefit therefrom. With the record in this state,
it was improper for the trial court to instruct on
assumption of risk at all. The court not only wrongfully
instructed on assumption of risk but compounded its
error by giving three separate instructions on this defense and, in effect, drilling it into the minds of the
jurors. The · prejudice resulting to the plaintiff from
these three instructions is patent on the face of said
instructions.
This court in the case of Shoemaker v. Floor (1950)
117 U. 434, 217 P. 2d 382, affirmed the trial judge's
findings as to lack of assumption of risk in a case where
the plaintiff stated that she had gone out 'vith the
defendant on several previous occasions and that on
such occasions he nearly alvvays had something to drink;
that the only effect that the drinking had upon him
which she noticed was that it caused him to drive faster;
that she saw him take three drinks in Pocatello during
the course of an hour and a half prior to the trip in
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question; that she had no reason to anticipate that there
might be any drinking on the trip when she left Salt
Lake City for Pocatello; and that, although she had
seen him take three drinks, she had seen him take three
drinks containing the same amount of liquor on previous
occasions without his appearing or acting other than
normal. Moreover, it has been held in a great number
of cases that mere knowledge that the driver has been
drinking is not sufficient to preclude recovery under the
Guest Statutes as the trial court here instructed in
Instruction No. 14 See 15 ALR 2d 1169, par. 4. The
authorities hold that the extent of the knowledge must
be such that the guest has knowledge or "\\ith the exercise
of reasonable care should have knowledge that the driver
i~ so under the influence of intoxicants as to be unfit
to operate his car. 15 ALR 2d 1170, par. 5.
In the case of Stack v. ]{ earnes (1950) 118 U 237,
221 P. 2d 594, this court upheld a jury finding of no
assumption of risk as to the defendanfs 'vilful misconduct when it \\~as sho"\\rn by the evidence that on the
same trip the defendant had driven at an excessive
rate of speed, at "~hieh tunes, plaintiff has requested
hi1n to slo"r do,\rn, and that there \\~as an opportunity
to leave the car prior to the return trip. The court
particularly noticed the fact that there 'vas no opportunity for plaintiff to get out of the auto1nobile after
it had beco1ne evident to hiin that the defendant did
not intend to heed his request as he had done before.
It will be reme1nbered that the evidence in the case at
bar sho,Ys that there "~Its no opportunity "Thatsoever
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for the decedent to leave the car of defendant after
defendant started on his wild drive over Bennion Hill
to the point of the accident.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION BASED ON WILFUL MISCONDUCT
AND INTOXICATION.

The trial court stated in Instruction 7 in part as
follows (R. 75) :

"* * * If the plaintiffs should prevail in your
finding as to either the issue of intoxication or
that of wilful misconduct as a proximate cause
of injuries or damages suffered by them, they
will be entitled to recover damages unless they,
or either of them, are barred from relief by contri~butory negligence, if any, or by an assumption
of the risk, if such there was under the instructions given you."
It will be noted in the instruction that the court had
originally used the word "misconduct" and had crossed
it out writing the word "negligence'' above it. Furthermore, the court in Instruction 4 part b, defined contributory negligence as follows (R. 72):
" 'Contributory negligence' means that a person injured has proximately contributed to such
injury by his want of ordinary care, so that except
for such want of ordinary care on his part the
injury would not have resulted."
In the aforesaid instructions, the trial court clearly
committed reversible error which was prejudicial to the
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plaintiff. In Instruction No. 7, the trial court instructed
the jury that there were two separate defenses which
the defendant had to the action, contributory negligence
and assumption of risk. It is true that there have been
a few authorities which have used the words "contributory negligence" and "assumption of risk" interchangeably. However, there are no authorities found which
have given a defendant both such defenses. The universal
rule is that contributory negligence is not a defense to
an action based upon wilful misconduct. This is stated
at 38 Am. Jur. 854, par. 178:
"There is an abundance of authority for the
proposition that contributory negligence is not
a defense in an action based upon "~ul or wanton
misconduct or intentional violence. Even in jurisdictions where the doctrine of comparative negligence is rejected as a general principle of the
comn1on la,v, contributory negligence is no defense to an action based on the defendant's reckless, wilfuL "Tanton, or intentional misconduct.
There is no more reason for permitting the defense of contributory negligence in a case where
the injury 'vas caused by 'villfut " . .anton, or
reckless 1uisconduct than there is for perinitting it in a case of a~saul t and battery.~~
It is also stated at 114 A.L.R. 837:
"IIov{ever~

even in jurisdictions " . .here the
doctrine of co1nparative negligence is repudiated,
it is conceded that contributory negligence is no
defense to an action based on defendant's reckless,
'vilfuL wanton, or intentional n1isconduct. ~'
N n1nerous authorities are cited substantiating the
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aforesaid statements. Also see Loomis v. Church (Idaho,
1954) 277 p. 2d 561.
It is well known Hornbook law that the aforesaid
statement is a sound and correct statement of the law.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error in holding as a matter of law that the deceased, Cecil Drewery
Eyre, was a guest in the automobile of the defendant,
when the evidence clearly showed that a benefit accrued
to the defendant from a trip which amounted to a joint
business venture. Subsequently, the trial court in its
instructions, in effect, directed a verdict against the plaintiff by instructing on matters that were extraneous to
the issues of the lawsuit such as the alleged scuffling,
vvhich according to defendant's own testimony had nothing to do with the accident and the detailed instructions
on negligence after having eliminated negligence from
the lawsuit and in particular, Instruction 6, which
stated that driving a vehicle while under the influence
of liquor is negligence as a matter of law.
The court proceeded to erroneously instruct on the
defense of assumption of risk with the evidence showing,
first, that there was nothing for the decedent to be
alarmed at concerning the sobriety of the defendant
and, second, that the evidence clearly showed that, after
the defendant started his wilful misconduct, the plaintiff had no opportunity to get out of the automobile.
It \vill be remembered that the defendant himself testified that the plaintiffs had no cause for alarm either
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as to his sobriety or as to his driving during the trip
to the ranch and back again. In effect, defendant is given
the advantage of being able to state "even if you believe
I lied under oath, you may still hold that the deceased
assumed the risk of my drunkeness and wilful misconduct." The trial court not only wrongfully instructed on
assumption of risk but greatly over· emphasized the
defense in three separate instructions, stating it over and
over again thereby creating irreparable prejudice to the
plaintiff.
The court further erred in instructing the jury that
contributory negligence is a defense to an a~tion based
on wilful misconduct and intoxication. This instruction
was clearly erroneous under the universal line of
authority on the subject. It is a basic principle of the
law of negligence that contributory negligence is only
a defense to a negligent act and is not a defense to an
act of wilful misconduct.
Plaintiff was not given a fair trial because of the
numerous errors conunitted by the trial court and is
entitled to have the case heard again before a jury
correctly and adequately instructed on the la'v governing
the case.
Respectfully subn1itted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK
JOHN L. BLACK
Attorneys/o1· Pla-intiff and Appellant
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